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NATURAL LAW, HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT,
AND THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
RAYMOND B. MARCINt
INTRODUCTION
The central issue of this conference is interjurisdictional marriage
recognition. The early case law on this issue was quite clear:
It is universally conceded that generally a marriage valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere - marriages contrary
to the laws of nature, and polygamous marriages, constituting
an exception to this fundamental rule.1
Often the "laws of nature" exception in the early cases was referenced
to a Christian understanding of natural law: "the laws of nature as
generally recognized in Christian countries .... *"2
The specific focus of this conference is on the problems posed by
the imminent recognition of homosexual marriages in one or more ju-
risdictions. The question posed by the "laws of nature" exception to
the interjurisdictional marriage recognition principle is whether le-
gally endorsed homosexual marriages, involving (as they must) socie-
tal approval and endorsement of homosexual conduct, are contrary to
natural law. An idea of the older attitude in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence towards homosexual conduct (or "sodomy" as it was generally
known)3 can be gleaned from a listing of a legal maxim in old Law-
French in the old Corpus Juris: "Sodomie est crime de majeste vers le
Roy Celestre," and translated in a footnote as "Sodomy is high treason
against the King of Heaven."4 At common law "sodomy" and the
phrase "infamous crime against nature" were often used
interchangeably. 5
t Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. A.B., St. John's Semi-
nary; A.B., Fairfield University; J.D., Fordham University; M.S.L.S., The Catholic Uni-
versity of America.
1. Annotation, Recognition of foreign marriage as affected by the conditions or
manner of dissolving it under the foreign law, or the toleration of polygamous marriages,
74 A.L.R. 1533 (1931) (emphasis added). See Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577 (Ala.
1938); Wheelock v. Wheelock, 154 A. 665 (Vt. 1931); Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal
Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364 (Va. 1939).
2. 55 C.J.S. Marriage, § 6 (1998) (emphasis added).
3. "Sodomy is a connection between two human beings of the same sex - the
male - named from the prevalence of the sin in Sodom." Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355,
356 (1858).
4. 58 C.J. 785 n.10 (1932).
5. Utah v. Johnson, 137 P. 632, 632-33 (Utah 1913) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *215).
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The statement that homosexual acts are contrary to the natural
law does not resound felicitously in contemporary ears. Even pre-
scinding from the fact that theories that invoke concepts like the "law
of nature" or "natural law" no longer dominate our society's jurispru-
dential and political philosophies (and in fact are flatly rejected by the
currently fashionable postmodernist movements of today), the state-
ment that homosexual acts are contrary to the natural law would still
evoke a negative reaction in many. The statement is usually (and su-
perficially) interpreted as a simple expression of majoritarian distaste
for activities found pleasurable by an ill-understood, and, therefore,
feared minority.
When the early British and American cases dealing with the ille-
gality or criminality of homosexual conduct condemned that conduct
as being contrary to the law of nature, however, they were drawing on
a body of scholarship and jurisprudential theory that went far beyond
majoritarian distaste for homosexual conduct. Those cases were in-
voking a body of scholarship and a theory that formed the basis of
Western civilization for more than a millennium - a theory as old as
nature, systematized in the writings of the early Greek and Roman
jurists, further developed in the philosophy of Saint Augustine of
Hippo, and reaching its zenith in the natural law theory of Saint
Thomas Aquinas.
Other conceptions of natural law theory have arisen in recent
generations, but it was the fully developed theory of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, explicated by his sixteenth and seventeenth century follow-
ers,6 that held sway in the era in which the early common law was
being formulated. It is that theory that is rightly regarded as classic
natural law jurisprudence and it was that theory that informed the
early common law decisions declaring homosexual conduct to be con-
trary to the law of nature.
This paper will explore the classic natural law theory of Saint
Thomas Aquinas and the reasons why that theory condemns homosex-
ual conduct as being contrary to the law of nature. One must hasten
to add that it is by no means original in doing so. This paper stands
beneath and in gratitude to the work of John Finnis, Gerard V. Brad-
ley, and Charles Rice of Notre Dame and Robert George of Princeton,
among others.
7
6. See THOMAS E. DAvITr, THE NATURE OF LAW 86-108, 195-218 (1951); Anton-
Hermann Chroust, A Summary of the Main Achievements of the Spanish Jurist-Theolo-
gians in the History of Jurisprudence, 26 AM. J. JuRIs. 112 (1981).
7. See John M. Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Rela-
tions: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JuRis. (forthcoming
1997); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301 (1995); CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAw 263-71
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THE NATURAL LAW THEORY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
Saint Thomas Aquinas was anything if not blunt in his condem-
nation of homosexual conduct:
[A] special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is ren-
dered unbecoming ... may occur in two ways: First, through
being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lust-
ful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the
natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human
race: and this is called the unnatural vice .. .[i.e.] copulation
with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female...
and this is called the vice of sodomy.
8
In the passage just quoted, Aquinas has clearly drawn the conclusion
that homosexual conduct ("copulation with an undue sex, male with
male, or female with female") is "contrary to the natural order of the
venereal act" as well as "contrary to right reason." He continuted by
stating that:
since by the unnatural vices [which he earlier identified as
masturbation, bestiality, homosexual copulation, and what
might be called heterosexual sodomy] man transgresses that
which has been determined by nature with regard to the use
of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is
gravest of all.9
But on what premises? What led him to these conclusions? What did
Aquinas mean by "the natural order" and "right reason?" The answers
to these questions demand at least an outline understanding of the
main principles of Aquinas' natural law theory. It is not the purpose
of this article to respond to the contemporary critiques of the Aquinist
position (Finnis, Bradley, and George have recently done so with great
skill).' ° The purpose of this paper is simply to explain Saint Thomas
Aquinas' position condemning homosexual conduct in the context of
his overall natural law theory and to address the major critiques that
Aquinas himself foresaw and addressed.
(Ignatius Press 1995). John Finnis' earlier article dealt largely with the treatment of
homosexual conduct in the writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and concluded that
all three 'regarded homosexual conduct as intrinsically shameful, immoral, and indeed
depraved or depraving." John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 9 No-
TRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 17 (1995).
8. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA, Secunda Secundae, quest. 154,
art. 11, vol. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., 1948). Most recent
scholarship refers to Saint Thomas Aquinas' magnum opus as the "Summa Theologiae."
The quotations in this paper, however, are taken from the work done by the Fathers of
the English Dominican Province in an earlier generation, at a time when it was more
common to refer to the opus as the "Summa Theologica," and thus, this paper stays with
that older appellation.
9. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, art. 12 (emphasis added).
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Aquinas' natural law theory, indeed his philosophical system in
general, is openly, unashamedly, and unapologetically theistic. To
some, that will no doubt be seen as a disqualification. But think about
it. Is God real? If surveys mean anything, something like ninety-four
per cent of the people in the United States of America believe in God,
or at least say they do. And it is probably not much of a stretch to
surmise that the vast majority of those ninety-four per cent under-
stand the concept of "God" consistently with one or another of our
three most prevalent religious traditions, specifically Christianity, Ju-
daism, or Islam. If that is true, then the vast majority of us believe, or
say we believe, in a God Who is deeply involved in and deeply con-
cerned with the human condition. Think further. There are probably
several ways of understanding the concept of "law," but perhaps the
simplest and most descriptively accurate way of understanding "law"
is that it represents and describes a fundamental ordering of the
human condition. Now, if "law" has profoundly to do with the human
condition, and if the vast majority of us believe in a God Who is deeply
involved in and deeply concerned with the human condition, why is it
that when we sit down to formulate a theory or a philosophy of "law,"
we seem to accept, almost as a given, the premise that God is irrele-
vant to the enterprise - almost as if we assume that God does not
exist at all? How can a theory of "law" be a true, or a complete, or even
an acceptable theory of reality if it ignores the Author of reality? Why
do we accept so easily the premise that God - the Source of all mean-
ing and of all reality - does not belong in intellectual explorations of
meaning and reality? If one thinks about it fairly and openly, a God-
centered philosophy is not a disqualification; it is a necessity.
An orientation centered on God is not, however, the starting point
or even a focal point in today's postmodern jurisprudential thought.
Quite the contrary. The starting premise, and indeed the main focal
point of the postmodern thinking that has come to dominate our soci-
ety's public philosophy is, perhaps, best exemplified by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's now well known description of the heart of constitu-
tional liberty: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."11 The important thing is not reality per se, but rather
"one's own" concept of reality. And, if we accept Justice O'Connor's
subjective humanism as valid, one has the constitutional right to de-
fine that reality for one's self. There we have it - a public philosophy
founded on a reality, or more properly a set of individualized realities,
divorced from objectivity itself and even from the idea of objective




truth or objective reality. In a sense, taken to its logical conclusion,
Justice O'Connor's dictum bespeaks a philosophical outlook either
centering God in the human individual (or rather in each and every
one of a chaotic gaggle of human individuals) or in recognizing the
human individual as "god" - but a very uncomfortable "god," a "god"
who is in potential conflict with innumerable other "gods" whose
claims to rights to define reality are just as valid as one's own.
Aquinas' philosophy, on the other hand, although recognizing and
defending human liberty, does not divorce that liberty from truth or
reality or objectivity. 12 Instead it grounds reality first on logical
proofs of the existence of the transcendent God, and then it grounds
human liberty in a system that accepts objective truth and reality.
13
One should not be overly sanguine about the possibility of reconciling
these two starting points - the postmodern (exemplified in Justice
O'Connor's dictum), and the Aquinist - because they are fundamen-
tally at odds.
And so it is that Aquinas' philosophy and his theory of natural
law is God-centered. It is also rationalistic and realistic - based
squarely on reason and intellect and on the conformity of intellectu-
ally perceived truth with objective reality. To put it simply, Aquinas
believed that God is the transcendent Author of reality and that there
are correct answers to moral problems, just as there are correct an-
swers to speculative or mathematical problems. The answers, how-
ever, are not easy to come by. Aquinas recognized that the ultimate
answers to all our problems - speculative as well as moral or practi-
cal - reside in the Mind of God. Aquinas referred to these ultimate
answers as the "Eternal Law" of God. God exists in eternity. We exist
in time. That is the nature of one of our dilemmas. God alone has the
"Big Picture." Absent extraordinary divine revelation, we cannot pos-
sibly have a perfect understanding of the content of God's Eternal
Law. We can, however, have an understanding of God's Eternal Law
- with our intellect and our reasoning capacity. Moreover, drawing
both on divine revelation and on earlier Platonic philosophy, Aquinas
recognized another aid. According to Aquinas, the moral require-
ments of God's Eternal Law are written on our hearts. Saint Paul, in
the same Epistle that contains one of the many scriptural condemna-
tions of homosexual conduct, 14 put it this way:
Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law [i.e., the di-
vinely revealed understandings of God's Eternal Law that are
12. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima, quest. 83.
13. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima, quest. 2, art. 3.




given in the scriptures], do by nature things required by the
law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not
have the law, since they show that the requirements of the
law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing
witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now even defend-
ing them. 15
The suggestion that God's Eternal Law is somehow written on the
human heart is not the exclusive province of sacred scripture. Aqui-
nas and his predecessors in natural law theory recognized that sensi-
bility in the philosophic concept of synderesis.16 Just as the
speculative intellect seems to have a natural bent towards the truth,
the practical intellect seems to have a natural bent towards the good.
In natural law theory, synderesis is both the ignition spark that acti-
vates the moral conscience and its guide. How synderesis works in the
area of moral decision making is perhaps best exemplified by drawing
an analogy to the way in which the speculative or mathematical intel-









The result of this problem leaves our intellect in a state of speculative
discomfort. Two cannot equal one, and yet the problem seems to have
yielded that result. It is the same, Aquinas said, with the practical
intellect. We sometimes work out moral problems in such a way that
our moral or practical intellect is left in a state of discomfort. Just as
the built-in principle of contradiction tells us that something has gone
wrong with our speculative or mathematical thinking, the built-in
principle of synderesis tells us that something has gone wrong with
our practical or moral thinking. Whereas, for the purpose of analysis
and examples, Aquinas often separated the intellect into the specula-
tive (dealing with mathematical and scientific reasoning) and the
practical (dealing with moral reasoning), he is very clear in declaring
that the speculative and the practical intellect are one and the same
intellect. The speculative and the practical are only distinguished by
their ends.1 7
15. Romans 2:14-15 (New Int'l Version).
16. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima, quest. 79, art. 12, at 407.
17. Id. Prima, quest. 79, art. 11, at 406.
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The philosophical concept of synderesis antedates Aquinas and is
indeed older than Christian philosophy. Plato used it under a differ-
ent name; he called it anamnesis. Platonic anamnesis connoted a
built-in "remembrance" of the perfect Platonic Forms or Archetypes,
including the Form or Idea or Archetype of the Good. Indeed, Cardi-
nal Ratzinger has said that he finds the term anamnesis more useful
in Catholic natural law thinking than the term synderesis.
18 By
whatever term it is known, synderesis is our practical intellect's "prin-
ciple of contradiction," the built-in tendency that keeps us oriented to-
ward the good in our quest for correct moral answers and that pricks
us with discomfort when we depart from that orientation by doing
something like the moral equivalent of dividing by zero (the defect in
our mathematical example).
The connection between synderesis and "conscience" is obvious.
Thomist theologian William E. May has referred to synderesis as the
general, as opposed to the particularized, moral conscience, "our habit-
ual awareness of the first principles of practical reasoning and of mo-
rality."1 9 If synderesis is a built-in awareness of the first principles of
moral reasoning, what, indeed, are those "first principles of moral rea-
soning" of which we are habitually aware and inclined towards? What
is the practical or moral intellect's equivalent to the principle of con-
tradiction for the speculative or mathematical intellect? Those ques-
tions lead us directly to the content of the natural law, the version of
God's Eternal Law that is, in Saint Paul's words, "written on our
hearts."
Aquinas, in assessing the general content of the natural law, be-
gan with a self-evident first principle. Just as truth is the first princi-
ple in the speculative intellect, so too "good" is the first principle of the
practical or moral intellect. Aquinas put it this way:
[Tihe first principle in the practical reason is one founded on
the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek
after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.
20
That first principle, it must be admitted, is question-begging in the
extreme, especially in the context of today's moral relativism. What is
"good?" What is "evil?"2 1 Is the legal recognition of same-sex unions
18. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth <http://www.cin.org/avatar/
ratzcons.html> (as presented at the 10th workshop for bishops, Dallas, Texas, Febru-
ary, 1991).
19. WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY 33 (rev. ed. 1994).
20. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima Secundae, quest. 94, art. 2, at
1009.
21. The difficulty in the contemporary postmodern world is that a view has come to
be dominant that anyone's concept of what is good is as morally worthy as anyone else's;
such a proposition almost seems to be accepted as a given in today's moral discourse.
1998]
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"good?" Some seem to think so. 2 2 How then did Aquinas eventually
reach the conclusion that homosexual conduct is contrary to the natu-
ral law?
Aquinas proceeded to take' some of the question-begging out of the
first principle of natural law. He began to answer our questions by
putting some content into the notion of "good." Aquinas listed three
sets of "precepts" of the law of nature, dividing them into the precepts
that (1) human beings have in common with all existing substances,
(2) those they have in common with nonrational animals, and (3) those
they share in common because they are rational beings. All existing
substances hold onto existence; so too do human beings. All animals,
by nature, do certain things. Aquinas listed two specifically: sexual
intercourse and education of offspring. And finally, the complexity of
reason has its input into the precepts of the natural law, in the forms
of a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live amica-
bly in society.23 Thomist theologian William E. May has nicely sum-
marized Aquinas' precepts of the law of nature as follows: "life itself,
the handing on and education of life, true knowledge about God, [and]
life in fellowship and amity with others....
With those precepts as starting points Aquinas called upon the
poser of a moral dilemma to reason his or her way to the correct moral
answer. In Aquinas' system, however, the task of the poser of the
moral dilemma is nothing less than a quest to touch the Mind of God.
Because one of the basic premises of Aquinas' rationalism and realism is that there is
an objectively correct answer to each moral dilemma, the postmodern view is definitely
not a given in Aquinas' natural law theory.
22. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibil-
ity, 32 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 163 (1995).
23. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima Secundae, quest. 94, art. 2, at
1009. In Aquinas' words:
[A]ccording to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of
the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to do good in
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inas-
much as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to
its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving
human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Sec-
ondly there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more spe-
cially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals:
and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural
law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, educa-
tion of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good,
according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man
has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society:
and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural
law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Id.
24. MAY, supra note 19, at 49.
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Recall the role of "synderesis" in Aquinas' natural law theory.
25 Pro-
fessor May put it this way: "[Niatural law... is the way human beings
actively participate in the divine law, ordering their own actions in
accordance with this law insofar as this law is inwardly known by
them."26 The quest for the correct moral answer, in other words, has
something "inner" about it, but it is not an inner quest for one's own
deepest feelings or one's own deeply felt values.
2 7 It is instead a quest
to discover, with the intellect and reason given us by our Creator and
with the aid of the spark of God's Eternal Law that exists in each of
His rational creatures, the true, objective moral reality. This point is
very important. It is the point at which classic natural law theory
departs from today's postmodern subjectivism. In Aquinas' system,
personal sin may have a subjective element to it, but moral principles
have true objective reality. Aquinas is no moral relativist or moral
subjectivist.
APPLYING AQUINAS' THEORY OF NATURAL LAW TO
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT
Aquinas' negative conclusions regarding homosexual conduct
flowed largely from his positive understandings of marriage in the
context of the natural law. Quoting the Roman Digests approvingly,
Aquinas announced that "[t]he union of male and female, which we
call matrimony, is of natural law."
28 Recalling that Aquinas had
based one of the prime precepts of the natural law, i.e., the procreation
and education of offspring, on what it is that human beings have in
common with other animals, he posed his own objection:
It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because the
natural law is what nature has taught all animals [citing the
Digests]. But in other animals the sexes are united without
matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.
2 9
Aquinas' response to his own posed objection stressed the needs of
human children:
[TIhere are animals whose offspring are able to seek food im-
mediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their
mother; ... in these there is no tie between male and female;
whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both
parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. MAY, supra note 19, at 60.
27. Aquinas' treatment of Original Sin and its aftermath gives an indication why
such a quest for one's own inner moral sensibilities is not likely to succeed. See SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima Secundae, quests. 82, 83, 85, at 956-62, 966-71.




may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the
child needs the parents' care for a long time, there is a very
great tie between male and female, to which tie even the ge-
neric nature inclines.
30
The import of the above quotes is that, in Aquinas' view, the hetero-
sexual union is the norm that God has implanted in that portion of His
created nature that comprises human beings.
To say, however, that the heterosexual union comports with the
natural law is not the same as saying that the homosexual union con-
flicts with it. If we accept Aquinas' conclusion that heterosexual mar-
riage is of the natural law, we might be led to conclude, as a self-
evident negative corollary, that marital infidelity does not comport
with the natural law, but it does not flow self-evidently from that
premise that sex outside of marriage, whether of the hetero- or homo-
sexual variety, violates the natural law. Certainly Aquinas did not
conclude that heterosexual marriage is commanded by the natural
law. 3 1 So why should sex outside of marriage be considered to be con-
trary to the natural law? Aquinas' answer, in the heterosexual con-
text, tied fornication or sex outside of marriage to his care-of-children
theme:
Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, be-
cause it is opposed to the good of the child to be born.., since
it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvan-
tageous to the future child.32
If the conclusion that heterosexual fornication is evil is drawn
from the premise that it is opposed to the good of a possible projected
child born as a result of the act, then the condemnation of homosexual
fornication cannot be based on the same opposition, since homosexual
conduct does not and cannot result in the birth of a child. How is it
then that Aquinas condemned homosexual conduct?
Aquinas' treatment of homosexual conduct in his Summa Theo-
logica occurred, as did his treatment of fornication, in the larger con-
text of his treatment of the vice of lust. Both fornication and
homosexual conduct are, in Aquinas' thought, species of the vice of
lust,33 which Aquinas defined essentially as "exceeding the order and
30. Id.
31. Id. Tertia, quest. 41, art. 2, at 2700.
32. Id. Secunda Secundae, quest. 154, art. 2, at 1811.
33. Drawing on Gratian's Decretals, Aquinas lists six species of lust: fornication,
adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and "the unnatural vice" (Aquinas' term for "sodomy,"
including homosexual conduct). See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Secunda
Secundae, quest. 154, art. 1, at 1808.
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mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts."
34 In his discussion of
why it is that lustful acts are so clearly violative of the natural law (or
the "order of reason"), Aquinas invoked nothing less than the self-
preservation of the human race:
The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to
observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more
sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the
use of venereal acts . . . is most necessary for the common
good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore
there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of rea-
son in this matter; so that if anything be done in this connec-
tion against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin.
Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode
of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without
any doubt lust is a sin.
35
In affording such a degree of extra protection for the heterosexual
marital relationship, Saint Thomas Aquinas was doing something
that the United States Supreme Court did almost six hundred years
later in Griswold v. Connecticut36 - and in a strikingly similar con-
text, i.e., respect for the integrity and importance of the heterosexual
marital relationship. In Aquinas' view, the procreation and education
of children are so important to the survival of the human race that the
heterosexual marriage norm, to paraphrase Justice Byron R. White's
twentieth century echo of Aquinas, 37 comes to the Court of natural
law (which is really the Court of God) with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
nonmarital sexual arrangements. Indeed there was a point in the ma-
jority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the Griswold
case at which the Court literally recognized the sacredness of the het-
erosexual marital relationship:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
38
34. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Secunda Secundae, quest. 153, art. 3, at
1806. In Aquinas' terminology, "lust" is confined to venereal (i.e., sexual) activity. Id.
Secunda Secundae, quest. 153, art. 1, at 1804.
35. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Secunda Secundae, quest. 153, art. 3, at
1806.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
The full quote from Justice White's concurring opinion is as follows:
Surely the right invoked in this case, to be free of regulation of the intimacies of
the marital relationship "comes to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting eco-
nomic arrangements."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
38. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
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That the United States Supreme Court later backed down from its rec-
ognition of transcendent primacy of the heterosexual marital relation-
ship 39 only serves to underscore Aquinas' refusal to back down: the
heterosexual marital relationship is not sacred simply because the
United States Supreme Court or even Saint Thomas Aquinas once
deigned to say that it is. It is sacred because, as Aquinas recognized,
it is God-ordained, a facet of God's own Eternal Law for humankind.
FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF AQUINAS' NATURAL LAW
THEORY
Aquinas knew of and met some of the usual arguments we hear
today concerning the supposed moral legitimacy of homosexual con-
duct. He posed one of those oft-heard arguments hypothetically (and
quite strongly):
It would seem that the unnatural vice [including homosexual
conduct] is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For
the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now
adultery, seduction and rape [also species of the vice of lust]
which are injurious to our neighbor, are seemingly more con-
trary to the love of our neighbor than unnatural sins, by
which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural
sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.40
His answer to this argument might not sit well with those who de-
mand or acquiesce in the removal of God from all public philosophy:
Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the
order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins con-
trary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated,
an injury is done to God, the Author of nature.
4 1
Another oft-heard argument against the thesis that homosexual
conduct is contrary to the law of nature is that homosexuality is the
"law of nature," at least in the context of each individual homosexual
person.4 2 Aquinas himself posed that very argument hypothetically,
albeit in a more generalized context than homosexuality. Aquinas
posited: "It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure
is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appe-
tite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place....
39. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Secunda Secundae, quest 154, art. 12, at
1819-20.
41. Id. Secunda Secundae, quest 154, art. 12, at 1820. See supra note 4 and accom-
panying text (describing "sodomy" in the old Corpus Juris as "high treason against the
King of Heaven").
42. In an upcoming article in the American Journal of Jurisprudence, John Finnis
has responded to a somewhat sophisticated variation of such an argument that had
been advanced by John Boswell. Finnis, 42 AM. J. JuRis. (forthcoming 1998).
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Therefore no pleasure is non-natural."43 After quoting Aristotle's
statement that "some things are pleasant not from nature but from
disease,"44 Aquinas went on to respond to the argument:
We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with
nature.... Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways.
First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of
man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called nat-
ural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to man
in respect of his reason.... Secondly, nature in man may be
taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which
is common to man and other animals, especially that part of
man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that
which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as re-
gards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as
regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford
man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find
some that are not natural speaking absolutely, and yet con-
natural in some respect. For it happens in an individual that
some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted,
so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, be-
comes accidentally natural to this individual... [citing exam-
ples, including "unnatural intercourse"].
45
Aquinas always insisted on the proper use of words and concepts.
Calling a given pleasurable activity "natural" does not make it natu-
ral, not even when what is "not natural speaking absolutely" has ac-
quired the appearance of being natural in an individual in whom
"some one of the natural principles of the species [has become] cor-
rupted. '46 If the law of nature were confined to the blind instincts
that human beings share with other animals, then the blindly instinc-
tual so-called "law of the jungle" would be the natural law. But
humans possess rationality, and rationality has its input into the con-
tent of the law of nature for all of humankind. It is those pleasures
that are in accord with reason that are of the natural law, both insofar
as reason and the natural law apply to humankind and insofar as rea-
son and the natural law apply to the individual. To analogize to our
mathematical example, if two cannot equal one for the rest of human-
kind, then two cannot equal one for the individual. The speculative
intellect and the practical intellect are one and the same. Truth is
objective, not subjective.
43. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 8, Prima Secundae, quest, 31, art. 7, at 726.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Livio Melina, Homosexual Inclination as an "Objective Disorder": Reflec-
tions of Theological Anthropology, 25 COMMUNIO: INT'L CATH. REV. 57, 60 (1998).
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Thus it is that we arrive at Aquinas' clear and unequivocal con-
demnation of homosexual conduct as being violative of the natural
law. In Aquinas' words:
[W]herever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby
the venereal act is rendered unbecoming [i.e., incompatible
with the right use of venereal actions47], there is a determi-
nate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First,
through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to
all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary
to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
human race: and this is called the unnatural vice. This may
happen in several ways. [Aquinas goes on to list four mani-
festations of unnatural vice: masturbation, bestiality, homo-
sexual acts, and unnatural heterosexual acts. He describes
homosexual conduct as] copulation with an undue sex, male
with male, or female with female, as the Apostle [i.e., Saint
Paul] states [citing Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans 1:27]:
and this is called the vice of sodomy.
48
Aquinas concluded that, of the listed unnatural vices, homosexual con-
duct, or sodomy, is second only to bestiality in grievousness.
49
CONCLUSION
Aquinas' theory of natural law formed the bedrock of jurispru-
dence and public philosophy for more than half a millennium in a civi-
lization and culture that was so ideologically and theologically united
that it could be called "Christendom." It had its influence on the for-
mation of our own civilization and culture. Today, our civilization and
culture, founded on the natural law, has been so definitively set loose
from its natural-law and its "Christendom" moorings that we are most
often referred to these days as a "Post-Christian" society. Aquinas'
theory, with its grounding in the Eternal Law of God and its inclusion
of God as the Author of nature and nature's laws, for weal or woe, no
longer dominates the scene. With our current widespread societal ac-
ceptance of the premise that God is irrelevant to public moral think-
ing, we find ourselves wallowing in a sea of moral relativism. What
we are left with is well summarized by Father John F. Harvey, the
founder of Courage, a Catholic outreach program serving the spiritual
needs of homosexual persons:
47. See SAiNT THoMAs AQUINAS, supra note 8, Secunda Secundae, quest. 154, art. 9,
at 1817.
48. Id. Secunda Secundae, quest. 154, art. 11, at 1819.
49. Id. Sucunda Secundae, quest. 154, art. 12, at 1820-21.
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There is something radically wrong with a culture that con-
stantly asserts rights without giving the foundations of such
rights in the natural moral law.
50
Ultimately, homosexual conduct and homosexual marriage are issues
of constitutional law. What dominates the constitutional law scene
today, however, is the postmodernist subjective relativism encapsu-
lated in Justice O'Connor's epithet glorifying "the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life," 5 coupled with what might be called a rudderless
brand of "natural law" jurisprudence. It is not much of a secret that,
despite the dauntless efforts of the few strict constructionists and posi-
tivist originalists that still exist in our society, American constitu-
tional law has ceased to be what it once was - a set of written
principles to be changed only through the use of the amendatory pro-
cess. It may be accurate to suggest that the United States Supreme
Court has become, in effect, an on-going constitutional convention,
creating something like a case-law constitution alongside the written
Constitution. In a sense, it is all very much a natural-law-type enter-
prise - an effort to discover the fundamental moral principles that
ought to govern our society in a source other than the written words of
the Constitution or the will of the Constitution-makers - an effort by
the justices to tap into a fundamental understanding of human nature
and the principles of social organization that flow therefrom. In the
process, of course, the justices do nod cursorily toward the text of the
written Constitution and its legislative history, but everybody under-
stands that the real source of the new fundamental moral norms is not
so much what is in the Constitution as the justices' thoughts about
what should be in there.
Perhaps one of the troubles, from the vantage point of legal phi-
losophy, is that when the justices engage in this process of constitu-
tion-making - this quest for the fundamental moral norms that
ought to govern our society - they do not look to the natural moral
law that has its source in God, the Author of nature. They rummage
elsewhere - among their own individual systems of political beliefs,
among the residues of our society's deteriorating moral value struc-
ture, or among the new dogmas and intimidations of the "political-
correctness" movement.
50. JOHN F. HARVEY, THE TRUTH ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY: THE CRY OF THE FAITHFUL
123 (1996).
51. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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